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Abstract Previous studies have demonstrated a bidirec-
tional relationship between social attitudes and imitation in
adults: pro-social attitudes promote imitation, and imitation
further increases positive social attitudes. Social attitudes
and the social brain are developing throughout the ado-
lescent years. Thus, the aim of this study was to test
whether pro-social attitudes promote imitation in an Ado-
lescent Group to the same extent as in an Adult Group.
Participants were primed with pro-social or non-social
words in a Scrambled Sentence Priming task. They then
completed an Imitation task wherein participants were
required to perform a lift action with either the index or
middle finger, whilst observing either a compatible action
(e.g. index finger response and observed index finger lift)
or an incompatible action (e.g. index finger response and
observed middle finger lift). In an Effector Priming control
condition, observed fingers remained stationary but a semi-
transparent green mask was added to either the compatible
or incompatible finger. The magnitude of the Imitation
Effect and Effector Priming Effect was calculated by
subtracting reaction times on compatible trials from those
on incompatible trials. In the Adult Group, social priming
specifically modulated the Imitation Effect: pro-social
priming produced a larger Imitation Effect but did not
modulate the Effector Priming Effect. In adolescents,
however, no effect of social priming was seen on either the
Imitation or Effector Priming measures. We consider
possible explanations for these results including the
immature development of social brain regions and reduced
experience of the relationship between social attitudes and
imitation in adolescence.
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Introduction
Joint action has been defined as a social interaction
whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions
in space and time to bring about a change in the environ-
ment (Sebanz et al. 2006). One example of this is the ‘Joint
Simon’ task in which participants see one of two cues (e.g.
red and green squares) appear on either the left or right of a
screen and are told that they should respond to a specific
cue (e.g. red square) and that another participant will
respond to the other cue. The knowledge that another
participant is responding to the redundant cue results in a
Simon effect that persists even if the participant cannot see
the actions of the other individual. That is, despite not
seeing the action of the other participant, there is a sig-
nificant effect of spatial compatibility on response time
which is normally only seen when the participant must
make differential responses to both cues (Sebanz et al.
2003). Another example of joint action is imitation. Imi-
tation is a form of joint action in which multiple actors may
coordinate their actions in space and time on the basis of
the actions they observe. By studying mechanisms of
imitation, we can also make progress in understanding the
mechanisms underlying other forms of joint action.
There is increasing evidence that unconscious imitation
promotes positive social attitudes (Chartrand and Bargh
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1999; Lakin and Chartrand 2003). It has been demonstrated
that when people are not aware that their behaviour is being
copied, being mimicked increases rapport (Chartrand and
Bargh 1999), feelings of closeness (Ku¨hn et al. 2010),
altruistic behaviour (van Baaren et al. 2004) and trust
(Bailenson and Yee 2005). In a study where half the par-
ticipants were mimicked by a confederate and half were
not, participants who were mimicked reported liking the
confederate more than those who were not (Chartrand
and Bargh 1999). In another study, waitresses who were
instructed to mimic their customers received bigger tips
than those who were instructed not to mimic (van Baaren
et al. 2003a). Thus, a range of studies suggests that
unconscious mimicry is linked to increased positive social
attitudes.
A number of studies suggest that the converse rela-
tionship—that positive social attitudes increase uncon-
scious mimicry—is also true. Early research suggested that
among romantic couples, there is a correlation between the
amount of rapport they feel with each other and the amount
of imitation that takes place during their interactions
(Bernieri 1988; Lafrance 1979, 1982; Lafrance and
Broadbent 1976). Van Baaren et al. varied self-construal
orientation and found that participants with either a tem-
porarily induced, or chronic, dominant interdependent self-
construal were more likely to match the behaviours of a
confederate than those with an independent self-construal
(van Baaren et al. 2003b). Recently Leighton et al. (2010)
demonstrated that unconscious priming of positive social
attitudes increases imitative behaviour in adults. In the
study by Leighton et al., each participant completed two
tasks: first, a social attitude priming task and then an
automatic imitation task. For the priming task, participants
formed sentences from sets of words that included pro-
social, neutral or anti-social terms (three groups). In each
trial of the automatic imitation task, participants were
required to perform a pre-specified hand movement (open
or close) as soon as they saw a hand on a computer screen
begin to move. The hand movement stimulus was either the
same as the pre-specified response (compatible trials, e.g.
open stimulus and open response) or the hand movement
stimulus was the opposite of the pre-specified response
(incompatible trials, e.g. close stimulus and open response).
Although participants are not required to imitate, imitative
responses (compatible trials) are consistently faster than
non-imitative responses (incompatible trials; Brass et al.
2000; Heyes et al. 2005). The magnitude of this Imitation
Effect was calculated as the reaction time difference between
incompatible and compatible trials. Leighton et al. found that
participants primed with pro-social words showed a larger
Imitation Effect than those primed with anti-social words,
and the neutral group showed an intermediate Imitation
Effect.
Although the psychological and neural mechanisms by
which social attitudes modulate imitation are currently
unknown, a number of studies suggest that the neural
mechanisms that underlie the representation of others
are involved in ‘top-down’ control of automatic imita-
tive responses (Brass et al. 2003, 2005; Spengler et al.
2010a, b). In a study using functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI), Brass et al. (2005) demonstrated that
inhibition of imitation, in contrast to inhibition of non-
imitative automatic responses (Stroop Task), activated both
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ). The MPFC and TPJ are part of the ‘social
brain’ (Brothers 1990; Frith 2007; Frith and Frith 2010), a
network of brain areas that is active when we process social
information, in particular when we represent the mental
states (intentions, desires, beliefs) of others (‘theory of
mind’). In addition to recruiting common neural areas, two
recent studies suggest that the control of imitation and the
representation of others are functionally associated. Spen-
gler et al. (2010b) showed that the degree to which par-
ticipants were able to inhibit imitative responses was
correlated with performance on a behavioural theory of
mind task and also with activity in the MPFC and TPJ
when participants performed a theory of mind task whilst
being scanned. Furthermore, patients with lesions to the
MPFC and TPJ show impaired performance on theory of
mind tasks, and the extent of their impairment correlates
with their degree of impairment on an imitation inhibition
task (Brass et al. 2003). Therefore, these studies suggest
that control of imitation and the representation of others
share a component process, and that parts of the social
brain may be responsible for mediating imitation as a result
of social priming.
Adolescence is an important period in the development
of social cognition and the social brain (for review see
Blakemore 2008, 2010). This period can be characterized
by changes in self-awareness (Sebastian et al. 2008; Harter
1990), in social behaviour (Brown 2004), and in responses
to social situations (Sebastian et al. 2010; Hillebrandt et al.
in press). For instance, Sebastian et al. (2010) showed that
self-reported affective responses to social exclusion are
significantly greater for adolescents compared to adults.
In addition to changes in social attitudes and behaviours,
the adolescent years are also a time when many structural
and functional changes are taking place in the brain. Both
cellular (Huttenlocher 1979) and MRI (Giedd et al. 1999;
Sowell et al. 1999; Paus 2005) studies suggest that some
brain regions, including parts of the social brain, are still
anatomically developing well into the adolescent years. For
example, a recent developmental MRI study that measured
cortical thickness in a sample of 375 participants aged 4–21
found that MPFC is one of the latest regions to mature,
with a peak in cortical thickness at around age 14 years
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(Shaw et al. 2008). Recent neuroimaging studies also
suggest functional maturation of the social brain that con-
tinues throughout adolescence. A number of studies have
reported increased activation of the MPFC in adolescents
relative to adults when representing the mental states
(Blakemore et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2006) or the emotions
(Burnett et al. 2009) of others. These studies suggest that
parts of the social brain, which may be responsible for
mediating imitation as a result of social priming, are still
maturing throughout the adolescent years. Therefore, this
experiment investigates development in adolescence of the
modulation of automatic imitation by social attitudes.
In the current experiment, we used a modified version of
the Leighton paradigm. As in the study by Leighton et al.,
each participant completed two tasks: a social attitude
priming task followed by an imitation task. In the priming
task, participants formed sentences from sets of words that
included either pro-social terms or non-social terms (two
groups). In each trial of the imitation task, which was a
modified version of the two alternative choice reaction time
task used in Brass et al. (2000), participants were required
to perform a lift action with either the index or middle
finger as soon as they saw a cue appear on screen. Con-
currently, participants observed a video of a finger lift. In
50% of trials, the observed effector was compatible with
the effector that the participant was required to use (e.g.
index finger response and observed index finger lift), and in
50% of trials, the observed effector was incompatible (e.g.
index finger response and observed middle finger lift). We
hypothesized that the effect of social priming on imitation
would differ as a function of age group.
In the original, naturalistic, experiments demonstrating a
link between pro-social attitudes and imitation (Lakin and
Chartrand 2003), it was unclear whether pro-social priming
increased imitation specifically. Imitation was measured by
scoring matching behaviour in naturalistic social interac-
tions. In the majority of these studies, a participant inter-
acted with a confederate who either shook their foot or
rubbed their face with above average frequency. Judges
measured the frequency of each action for each participant,
yielding an ‘imitation score’. For example, imitation
involved foot shaking in the presence of a foot shaking
confederate but not in the presence of a face-rubbing
confederate. However, this paradigm does not allow one to
answer the question of whether social attitudes modulate
imitation of another’s specific movements, or whether they
just copy the degree to which the effector is moved.
Observing a foot shaking model may result in increased
performance of a variety of foot movement, which may
indirectly increase the proportion of foot shaking. Non-
specific effects of this kind are known in the motor control
literature as ‘effector priming’ (Bach and Tipper 2007;
Berger and Hadley 1975; Gillmeister et al. 2008).
In contrast, the effect reported by Leighton et al. was
specific to the movement type required. Pro-socially
primed adults were faster to conduct a hand-open
response when observing a hand-open response rather
than being faster to open their hand when observing any
hand movement. Leighton et al. therefore argue that
modulation of imitation by social attitudes does not occur
indirectly via effector priming. To test this hypothesis, we
added a control condition to our imitation task wherein no
finger movement was present, instead a semi-transparent
green mask was superimposed over either the compatible
or incompatible finger. The green mask draws attention to
the effector but does not afford imitation since no
movement is present. It has previously been demonstrated
that drawing attention to an effector, even if the effector
is static, produces speeding of responses made with that
effector. For example, Bach and Tipper (2007) showed
that presenting participants with photographs of individ-
uals with a coloured dot on either their hands or their feet
speeded responses made by participants using the same
effector. We hypothesized that adult participants primed
with pro-social words would show a greater Imitation
Effect than those primed with non-social words in the
Imitation task but that performance on the Effector




The study included 90 participants divided into four
groups: Non-social Adolescent Group (N = 17, mean
age = 13.71, Standard Error (SEM) = 0.19); Pro-social
Adolescent Group (N = 17, mean age = 13.82, SEM =
0.18); Non-social Adult Group (N = 28, mean age =
28.07, SEM = 2.58); Pro-social Adult Group (N = 28,
mean = 25.79, SEM = 2.00). For each age group, the
Non- and Pro-social groups were matched in terms of age
(Adolescent Groups: t(32) = -0.46, P = 0.65 (2-tailed);
Adult Groups: t(54) = 0.70, P = 0.49 (2-tailed)). Adults
were recruited from the University College London Psy-
chology volunteer database, and adolescents were recruited
from two local schools. Within these age groups, the par-
ticipants were randomly allocated to the Pro-social or Non-
social Group. All participants were naı¨ve with respect to
the purpose of the experiment. Informed consent was
obtained from all adults and from the primary caregiver of
each adolescent participant. The study was approved by the
local ethics committee and performed in accordance with






A modified version of the Scrambled Sentence Priming
task used in Leighton et al. (2010) was employed. There
were 36 trials in total. Each trial showed five words
arranged vertically down the centre of the screen. The task
was to pick 4 of the 5 words to make a grammatically
correct sentence. Words were presented in Arial, font size
24. The colour of the words (red, green, black or blue)
varied randomly over trials in order to suggest to the par-
ticipant that the aim of the task was to investigate the effect
of colour on word processing and hence distract from the
priming nature of the task.
Two versions of the priming task were used: one to
prime a pro-social attitude, one to prime a non-social
attitude. For both versions, 24 of the 36 trials contained a
priming word, that is, they contained an adjective or verb
semantically related to the target attitude (pro-social or
non-social). Twelve of the sentences were neutral (e.g. ‘‘the
car was small’’). This corresponds to a 2/3 saturation level,
which has previously been shown to be effective for
priming target attitudes without provoking conscious
awareness of this target attitude (R. Van Baaren, personal
communication). For the pro-social priming version, the 24
priming words were: friend, talkative, sociable, married,
outgoing, crowded, cooperative, agreeable, family,
friendly, group, others, team, chatty, gathering, together,
unity, sharing, joined, interactions, society, meeting, com-
munity, popularity (e.g., ‘‘he is very talkative’’). For the
non-social priming version, the 24 priming words were
rebel, selfish, alone, single, independent, withdrawn,
secluded, uncooperative, disagreeable, independence, pri-
vate, himself, individual, think, solitary, solo, detached,
lone, separate, one, isolated, personal, self, unpopular (e.g.
‘‘she is often withdrawn’’). Priming task duration was
approximately 15 min.
Automatic Imitation and Effector Priming Control Tasks
In order to obtain a reaction time (RT) measure of auto-
matic imitation in a classroom/laboratory setting, we used a
modified version of the two alternative choice reaction time
task used in Brass et al. (2000). Short video sequences of a
human hand were presented on the computer screen. The
video sequences subtended approximately 6" visual angle
vertically and 9" visual angle horizontally and consisted of
five full-colour frames presented on a black background.
The hand was presented in the vertical orientation (with the
fingers pointing to the right), whereas the participant rested
their hand in a horizontal orientation (fingers point to the
computer screen) on the computer keypad; hence, response
movements were orthogonal to stimulus postures. This
feature of the design allows automatic imitation to be
isolated from spatial compatibility.
The Imitation and Effector Priming Control tasks com-
prised a 2 9 2 factorial design with the factors Compati-
bility (between participant’s finger and on screen finger:
Compatible, Incompatible) and Experimental Task (Imita-
tion Task, Effector Priming Control Task). For 50% of the
compatible trials, the finger lifted (or changed to a green
colour in the Effector Priming Control Task) was the index
finger, and for 50% of the incompatible trials, the manip-
ulated finger was the middle finger. There were 30 trials
per trial type, 120 trials in total. Trials from the Imitation
and Effector Priming Control Tasks were pseudo-ran-
domized such that one trial type never occurred more than
twice in a row. The duration of the Imitation plus Effector
Priming Control Task was approximately 15 min.
On each trial, the participant was required to place the
index finger of their right hand on the letter ‘V’ on the
computer keyboard and the middle finger of their right
hand on the letter ‘B’ on the keyboard. Participants were
told to lift the finger up as quickly as possible and then
replace it on the same key. They should lift their index
finger if a number 1 appeared on the screen and lift their
middle finger if a number 2 appeared on the screen. The
imperative stimulus (the 1 or 2) appeared between the
index and middle fingers and marked the onset of the
response period. After the appearance of the imperative
stimulus, the stimulus video was presented for 3,000 ms.
The nature of the stimulus video depended on whether the
trial was of the Imitation Task, or the Effector Priming
Control Task.
Imitation task
In 50% of Imitation Task trials, the video sequence
depicted an action that was compatible with the partici-
pant’s required movement (e.g. the participant was
required to lift the index finger, and the video showed an
index finger lift); on 50% of trials, the video showed an
incompatible action (e.g. the participant was required to lift
the index finger and the video showed a middle finger lift).
The RT difference between incompatible and compatible
trials was used as an index of automatic imitation (Imita-
tion Effect).
Effector priming control task
Stimulus videos used in the Effector Priming Control Task
were not of an action. Rather, one of the fingers acquired a
semi-transparent green mask (Fig. 1b). On 50% of trials,
the finger that changed colour was compatible with the
instructed response (e.g. an index finger response was
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required, and the colour of the index finger changed to
green), and on 50% of trials, the finger that changed colour
was incompatible with the required response (e.g. an index
finger response was required, and the middle finger chan-
ged colour). The RT difference between incompatible and
compatible trials generated an index of effector priming
(Effector Priming Effect).
Stimuli
In both the Effector Priming Control Task and Imitation
Task, stimuli were presented on a computer screen at a
distance of approximately 57 cm.
Stimulus videos in the Imitation task were comprised of
five frames (Fig. 1a). The first was a photograph of a hand
at rest against a blue worktop. This frame was displayed for
a variable interval with range 800–2,400 ms and acted as a
warning signal. The second frame was a photograph of the
index or middle finger 1/3rd of the way through a lifting
action and a number 1 or 2. The third was a photograph of
the same finger 2/3 of the way through a lifting action.
These frames were displayed for 34 ms. The fourth frame
was a photograph of the finger in the fully lifted position,
which was displayed for 500 ms. These display durations
ensured the appearance of a short video clip of a finger
being lifted with the concurrent appearance of a number.
The fifth frame was a blank screen. This frame remained on
screen until the duration of the trial had reached 3,000 ms
and until the participant had returned both fingers to the
letters V and B on the keyboard.
Stimulus videos in the Effector Priming Control task
were comprised of three frames (Fig. 1b). The first was a
photograph of a hand at rest, displayed for a variable
interval with range 800–2,400 ms. For the second frame,
the finger in the photograph was coloured green, and a
number 1 or 2 was added to the image. This frame was
displayed for 568 ms. The third frame was a blank screen
the same blue as the background in frames 1 and 2. This
frame remained on screen until the duration of the trial had
reached 3,000 ms and until the participant had returned
both fingers to the response keys; hence, both Imitation and
Effector Priming Control Trial types were of the same
duration.
Testing procedure
Participants were tested in groups of approximately 10–20
individuals under exam conditions; adolescents were tested
in their school computer cluster room, and adults were
tested in a computer cluster room at UCL. Participants
Fig. 1 a The five frames of an Imitation Task trial. The frames
shown here constitute a compatible video where the participant must
lift their index finger whilst watching an index finger lift. Video
duration was 3,000 ms. b The three frames of an Effector Priming
Control trial. The frames shown here constitute a compatible Effector
Priming trial where the participant must lift their index finger, whilst




were informed that they would be asked to take part in two
separate experiments, one on the effect of colour on word
processing and the other on responses to numbers. Prior to
testing all participants were read standardized instructions
and completed 5 example trials of the Scrambled Sentence
Priming task. Participants were shown an example of each
trial type from the Imitation and Effector Priming Control
Tasks. All participants were also presented with a written
version of the instructions. For both the pro- and non-social
priming tasks, participants were told that they would see
five words on the screen and that they should use four of
the five words to make a grammatically correct sentence.
The subjects were instructed to select the words by clicking
on each one with the computer mouse. They were told that
once they had clicked on the fourth and final word in their
created sentence, a new screen would appear with five
different words. For the Imitation and Effector Priming
Control tasks, participants were told to place the index
finger of their right hand on the letter ‘V’ on the computer
keyboard and the middle finger of their right hand on the
letter ‘B’ on the keyboard. Participants were told to lift
their index finger if a number 1 appeared on the screen and
lift their middle finger if a number 2 appeared on the
screen. Before the Imitation and Effector Priming Control
tasks commenced, participants conducted a training ses-
sion. The training programme required participants to
make 5 correct consecutive responses in order for them to
continue onto the experimental version of the task. The
probability of making 5 correct consecutive responses by
chance is\0.05; therefore, the training task ensured that
participants could perform the task before data collection
began.
Following the Imitation and Effector Priming Control
tasks, participants were asked to complete a debriefing
questionnaire designed to ascertain whether participants
had guessed the purpose of the experiment (see Leighton
et al. 2010). This questionnaire included the following
questions: ‘‘What do you think the purpose of this exper-
iment was? What do you think this experiment was trying
to study? Did you think that any of the tasks were related in
any way? If yes, in what way? Did anything you did on one
task affect anything you did in another task? If yes, then
how did it affect you? When you were arranging the words,
did you notice anything unusual about the words? Did you
notice a pattern or theme to the words? Did you have a
particular goal or strategy when arranging the words?’’
Data analysis
Priming task
For all participants, all of the sentences produced in the
Priming task were scored. A grammatically incorrect
sentence yielded an error score of 1. Error scores for all 32
sentences were then summed to give an error score across
all sentences.
Imitation and effector priming control tasks
For the Imitation and Effector Priming Control tasks, error-
trials in which the participant lifted the incorrect finger
were removed from the analysis. RTs were filtered such
that those less than 150 ms were excluded under the
assumption that they were expectancy errors and those
longer that 2,000 ms were excluded under the assumption
that they reflected a lapse in attention.
Results
All results are reported using an a of P\ 0.05. Two-tailed
tests are used except where a directional prediction has
been made on the basis of pre-existing literature. When a
one-tailed test has been used, this is indicated following a
statistically significant result.
Examination of the debriefing questionnaire data indi-
cated that no participant correctly guessed the purpose
of either the Priming or Imitation and Effector Priming
Control tasks. Furthermore, no participant correctly iden-
tified a link between the studies or a theme among the
words presented in the Priming task. Therefore, we can
conclude that no participant was aware of the type of
priming they had received or that the purpose of the study
was to examine imitation and its relationship with social
attitudes.
Priming task
In the Priming task, no group made more than 2 errors on
average (Adolescent Non-social mean = 1.41; Adolescent
Pro-social mean = 1.59; Adult Non-social mean = 1.39;
Adult Pro-social mean = 0.93). To test whether either Age
or Prime Group significantly affected the number of errors,
we employed a 2 9 2 ANOVA with between-subjects
factors Age Group and Prime Group. There was no sig-
nificant interaction between Age and Prime Group
(F(1,86) = 0.63, P = 0.43) and no main effect of Age
Group (F(1,86) = 0.71, P = 0.40) or Prime Group
(F(1,86) = 0.13, P = 0.72). To be sure that no one group
produced more errors for the sentences which contained
prime words, we created a ‘priming sentence error score’
by summing errors for the 24 sentences which contained a
priming word. No group made more than 2 errors on
average (Adolescent Non-social mean = 1.12; Adolescent
Pro-social mean = 1.06; Adult Non-social mean = 1.07;
Adult Pro-social mean = 0.68). To test whether Age or
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Prime Group had a significant effect on ‘priming sentence
error score’, we employed a 2 9 2 ANOVA with between-
subjects factors Age Group and Prime Group. There was no
significant interaction between Age and Prime Group
(F(1,86) = 0.25, P = 0.62) and no main effect of Age
Group (F(1,86) = 0.42,P = 0.52) orPrimeGroup (F(1,86) =
0.47, P = 0.50). Hence, all groups exhibited equivalent per-
formance on the Priming task.
Imitation and effector priming tasks
Error analysis
Error rates (defined as incorrect responses and reaction
times less than 150 ms, and greater than 2,000 ms) were
low in both the Imitation Task (7.9% of trials) and the
Effector Priming Task (6.5% of trials). For the Imitation
and Effector Priming tasks, errors on Incompatible trials
are of theoretical relevance for the current study as they
indicate a failure to inhibit responding on the basis of
automatic imitation and effector priming, respectively.
Therefore, errors on Incompatible trials were entered into a
2 9 2 ANOVA with factors of Age Group (Adult, Ado-
lescence) and Prime Group (Pro-social, Non-social). For
the Imitation Task, this ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of Age Group (F(1,83) = 10.0, P = 0.002);
however, the main effect of Prime Group and the interac-
tion between Age and Prime Group were not significant
(both F(1,83)\ 1). The main effect of Age reflects an
increased tendency to imitate in the Adolescent Group
(Adolescent Group mean error rate 14.0% of Incompatible
Trials, Adult error rate 7.3% of Incompatible trials) that
was not affected by the Prime Group factor. The same
ANOVA performed on the Effector Priming Task revealed
a marginally significant effect of Age Group F(1,83) =
3.9, P = 0.051) but the main effect of Prime Group and the
Prime x Age Group interaction was not significant (both
F(1,83)\ 1). The main effect of Age reflects an increased
tendency to respond on the basis of effector compatibility
in the Adolescent Group (Adolescent Group mean error
rate 9.8% of Incompatible Trials, Adult error rate 5.1% of
Incompatible trials) that was not affected by the Prime
Group factor.
RT analysis
The magnitude of the Imitation Effect was calculated, for
each participant, by subtracting RT on compatible trials
from RT on incompatible Imitation task trials. Similarly, an
index of Effector Priming Effect was calculated, for each
participant, by subtracting RT in compatible trials from RT
in incompatible trials from the Effector Priming Control
Task. Table 1 shows the Imitation and Effector Priming
Effects for each Prime Group in each Age Group.
Differential effects of pro-social/non-social priming
on imitation in adolescents compared to adults
Paired samples t tests on compatible and incompatible RTs
for Imitation trials demonstrated that each of the four groups
exhibited a significant Imitation Effect (Adolescent Non-
social Group incompatible trials mean RT (SEM) = 547.87
(23.50), compatible trials mean RT (SEM) = 497.26
(18.05), t(16) = 4.22, P\ 0.001, 1-tailed; Adolescent Pro-
social Group incomp mean RT (SEM) = 516.53 (21.49),
comp mean RT (SEM) = 478.55 (17.01), t(16) = 4.12,
P\ 0.001, 1-tailed; Adult Non-social Group incomp mean
RT (SEM) = 508.89 (14.35), comp mean RT (SEM) =
470.91 (12.90), t(27) = 5.28, P\ 0.001, 1-tailed; Adult
Pro-social Group incomp mean RT (SEM) = 573.29
(29.76), comp mean RT (SEM) = 502.18 (22.13), t(27) =
6.03, P\ 0.001, 1-tailed). That is, for each group, responses
were faster when observing a lift of the same finger than
when observing a lift of a different finger. To examine
whether social priming differentially affects adolescents and
adults, we conducted a 2 9 2 ANOVA with between-sub-
jects factors Age Group (Adolescent, Adult) and Prime
Group (Pro-social, Non-social). The ANOVA revealed a
significant interaction between Age and Prime Group
(F(1,86) = 4.61, P = 0.02, 1-tailed). There was no main
effect of Age Group (F(1,86) = 0.93, P = 0.34 or Prime
Group (F(1,86) = 0.93, P = 0.34). Post hoc independent
Table 1 Imitation and Effector Priming Effects for each Prime Group for each Age Group
Adolescent Adult
Non-social Pro-social Non-social Pro-social
Mean Imitation Effect (SEM) 50.62 (11.99) 37.98 (9.23) 37.98 (7.19) 71.11 (11.79)
Mean Effector Priming Effect (SEM) 38.55 (8.02) 35.23 (9.25) 49.44 (8.28) 55.55 (14.84)
The Imitation Effect is the RT difference between incompatible (e.g. Participant lifts index finger and watches a video of a middle finger lift) and
compatible (e.g. Participant lifts index finger and watches an index finger lift) trials in the Imitation Task. The Effector Priming Effect is the RT
difference between incompatible (e.g. Participant lifts index finger and observes a middle finger changing colour) and compatible (e.g.
Participant lifts index finger and observes an index finger changing colour) trials in the Effector Priming Control task
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t-tests revealed that for the Adult Group the Imitation Effect
was significantly greater for the Pro-social Group (Mean =
71.11, SEM = 11.79) than for the Non-social Group
(Mean = 37.98, SEM = 7.19; t(54) = -2.40, P\ 0.01,
1-tailed). No such significant difference between Prime
Groups existed for the Adolescent Age Group (Fig. 2:
Pro-social: Mean = 37.98, SEM = 9.23; Non-social:
Mean = 50.62, SEM = 11.99; t(32) = 0.84, P = 0.41).
Hence, social priming differentially affected imitation in
adolescents and adults.
Specificity of social priming effects on mechanisms
of imitation
Paired samples t tests on compatible and incompatible RTs
for Effector Priming Control trials demonstrated that each of
the four groups exhibited a significant Effector Priming
Effect (Adolescent Non-social Group incompatible trials
mean RT (SEM) = 570.91 (21.42), compatible trials mean
RT (SEM) = 532.36 (19.73), t(16) = 4.81, P\ 0.001,
1-tailed; Adolescent Pro-social Group incomp mean RT
(SEM) = 540.04 (17.81), comp mean RT (SEM) = 504.82
(19.76), t(16) = 3.81, P\ 0.01, 1-tailed; Adult Non-social
Group incomp mean RT (SEM) = 532.22 (15.61), comp
mean RT (SEM) = 482.77 (13.44), t(27) = 5.97, P\
0.001, 1-tailed; Adult Pro-social Group incomp mean RT
(SEM) = 571.12 (29.59), comp mean RT (SEM) = 515.57
(20.91), t(27) = 3.74, P\ 0.001, 1-tailed). That is, for each
group, responses were faster when the same finger changed
colour than when a different finger changed colour.
Data from the Imitation task show that adult participants
are significantly affected by social priming, but that ado-
lescent participants are not. In order to confirm that the
social priming effect on imitation seen in adults is specific
to imitation (as found by Leighton et al. 2010), we con-
ducted a 2 9 2 ANOVA with between-subjects factor
Prime Group (Pro-social, Non-social) and within-subjects
factor Experimental Task (Imitation task, Effector Priming
Control task) for the Adult Group. There was a significant
interaction between Prime Group and Experimental Task
(F(1,54) = 2.89, P\ 0.05, 1-tailed). The same analysis
conducted on the Adolescent Pro- and Non-social Groups
(which do not differ in terms of imitation) did not show a
significant interaction (F(1,32) = 0.30, P = 0.58). T-tests
showed that for the Adult Group the interaction was driven
by a significant difference in the magnitude of the Imitation
Effect for the Pro-social (Mean = 71.11, SEM = 11.79)
compared to Non-social Group (Mean = 37.98, SEM =
7.19; t(54) = -2.40, P\ 0.01, 1-tailed) but no significant
difference between the Prime Groups in terms of the
Effector Priming Effect (Fig. 3: Pro-social: Mean = 55.55,
SEM = 14.84; Non-social: Mean = 49.44, SEM = 8.28;
t(54) = -0.36, P = 0.36). The three-way interaction
between Prime Group (Pro-social, Non-social), Age Group
(Adolescent, Adult) and Experimental Task (Imitation task,
Effector Priming Control task) approached significance
(F(F(1,86) = 2.22, P = 0.07, 1-tailed). The preceding
analyses were repeated on the raw RT data, including a
repeated measures factor of Compatibility (Compatible,
Incompatible) in order to assess whether Prime Group, Age
Group, or the interaction between these factors affected RT
irrespective of Compatibility. These effects were all non-
significant (all Ps[ 0.1).
In order to assess the mechanism by which social
priming affects imitation, the relationship between
response speed and the social priming effect in each age
group was examined. Reaction times were sorted according
to the factors of Compatibility, Age Group and Prime
Group and independently separated into three time bins,
representing fast, medium and slow responses. The
Fig. 2 Imitation Effects for Adolescent and Adult Pro- and Non-
social Prime Groups. The ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
between Age and Prime Group. Post hoc t tests revealed that for the
Adult Group the Imitation Effect was significantly greater for the Pro-
social Group than for the Non-social Group. No such significant
difference between Prime Groups existed for the Adolescent Age
Group
Fig. 3 For the Adult Group, there was a significant difference in the
magnitude of the Imitation Effect for the Pro-social compared to Non-
social Prime Group but no significant difference between the Prime
Groups in terms of the Effector Priming Effect
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difference between mean Compatible and Incompatible
reaction times at each time bin was entered into a
3 9 2 9 2 ANOVA with factors of Speed (Fast, Medium,
Slow), Age Group (Adult, Adolescent) and Prime Group
(Pro-social, Non-social). As Mauchley’s test of sphericity
was significant, degrees of freedom were corrected using
the Greenhouse-Geisser method. Results of this ANOVA
revealed a significant Speed x Age Group x Prime Group
Interaction (F(1.2, 97.7) = 6.0, P = 0.01). Inspection of
the means (Fig. 4) of each condition at each of the time
bins suggests that the effect of pro-social priming is seen
only in the Adult Group at the slowest reaction times. The
interaction between Speed, Age and Prime Group was
decomposed by performing ANOVAs with factors of Age
and Prime Group at each of the 3 time bins. There was a
significant interaction between Age and Prime Group at the
slowest time bin (F(1,83) = 6.0, P = 0.01), but not at the
medium (F(1,83) = 2.7, P = 0.10), or fast time bins
(F(1,83)\ 1), although the interaction approached signif-
icance at the medium time bin. These analyses were fol-
lowed-up with univariate ANOVAs with a between-groups
factor of Prime Group at each combination of the Speed
and Age Group factors. The effect of Prime Group was not
significant for any time bin in the Adolescent Group (all
Ps[ 0.244). The effect of Prime Group was not significant
in the Adult Group at the fastest time bin (F(1,54) = 1.7,
P = 0.2), approached significance at the medium time bin,
(F(1,54) = 2.9, P = 0.09), and was significant at the
slowest time bin (F(1,54) = 6.4, P = 0.01).
Discussion
Previous research has demonstrated that in adults priming a
positive social attitude in comparison with a negative social
attitude promotes imitation (Leighton et al. 2010). Since
social attitudes and the social brain are changing through-
out the adolescent years, the aim of this study was to test
whether pro-social attitudes promote imitation in an Ado-
lescent Group to the same extent as in an Adult Group.
In agreement with the results of Leighton et al., we found
that adults who had been primed with words promoting
pro-social attitudes (e.g. friend, crowded, team, talkative)
showed a greater Imitation Effect than adults who had been
primed with words promoting non-social attitudes (e.g.
himself, solo, one, private). The difference in the degree of
modulation of imitation by social priming was significantly
greater for adults than for adolescents. Indeed, there was no
significant difference between the amount of imitation
shown by adolescents primed with pro-social words com-
pared with adolescents primed with non-social words.
It is unlikely that the inefficacy of pro-social priming on
imitation for the Adolescent Group is due to an ineffective
pro-social priming technique. The prime words in the
Priming task were selected on the basis that they feature in
the common vocabulary of both adolescent and adult par-
ticipants. Throughout the testing sessions, none of the
participants questioned the definition of the words. Fur-
thermore, statistical analyses demonstrated that for all
groups the average error rate on the Priming task did not
exceed 2 of 32 sentences, and there was no significant
difference between the error rates generated by the four
groups. Hence, all groups were able to use the scrambled
words to create a grammatically correct sentence.
The associative sequence learning model (Heyes 2001,
2003; Heyes and Ray 2000; Brass and Heyes 2005) sug-
gests that imitation is mediated by low-level mechanisms
in which activation of a sensory representation of a body
movement (e.g. by visual attention to that movement)
necessarily results in activation of a motor representation
of the same movement (and thereby an impulse to perform
the movement), provided that the sensory and motor rep-
resentations have become linked through previous, corre-
lated experience of observing and executing the movement.
In principle, social attitudes could modulate imitation via
an attentional route—by influencing the probability that
sensory representations of body movement will be acti-
vated (see also Teufel et al. 2010)—or via an inhibitory
route—by influencing the degree to which activation of
motor representations by associated sensory representa-
tions is suppressed to prevent overt performance of the
represented movement (see also Liepelt and Brass 2010).
Leighton et al. (2010) argue that positive social attitudes
most likely promote imitation via an inhibitory route rather
than an attentional route. They argue that the attentional
route is less likely since imitation tasks such as the one
used in the current experiment require attention to the same
part of the screen as the movement stimuli (i.e. in the
Fig. 4 Social priming affects slow, but not medium or fast, responses
in adult participants. This suggests that social priming affects the
inhibition of imitative responses
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current experiment the cue to move was presented equi-
distant from the index and middle fingers of the video
hand); also any trials in which participants did not attend
are detected by checking for incorrect responses and for
abnormally long or short reaction times, and these trials are
excluded from the analysis.
The suggestion that social priming affects inhibition of
imitative responses was investigated in the current data by
performing a ‘bin analysis’ on the reaction time data from
the Imitation Task to investigate whether response speed
interacts with the effect of the priming manipulation. The
results of the bin analysis revealed that the effect of social
priming, that was evident in adults, was seen only for
slower responses. Following previous studies (see Catmur
and Heyes 2010), we suggest that this pattern of data fits a
model of social priming affecting late processes related to
inhibition, rather than an attentional process (where effects
of social priming may be expected to be seen for even the
fastest responses). Our results therefore suggest that, for
adults, positive social attitude priming leads to the release
of inhibition of imitative motor output and that this process
does not occur for adolescents. At present, the functional
mechanism by which imitation inhibition is reduced by
pro-social priming is unknown; however, Brass et al.
(2005) argue that imitation inhibition relies on appropriate
distinction between motor programmes initiated by the self,
and those initiated by observation of the other. It is possible
therefore that the effect of pro-social priming is to blur the
distinction between the self and other and thus reduce the
potential for imitation inhibition.
Previous research has shown that being imitated pro-
motes pro-social behaviour (Chartrand and Bargh 1999),
and consequently, it has been suggested that imitation is a
non-conscious tool that individuals use instinctively to
facilitate social interactions with others (Cheng and Char-
trand 2003; Lakin and Chartrand 2003; Chartrand and
Jeffers 2003). Ku¨hn et al. (2010) investigated the mecha-
nism by which being imitated may lead to pro-social
behaviour using fMRI and found that observing another
individual being imitated activated neural structures
involved in reward processing such as the ventral MPFC
and medial orbitofrontal cortex. These areas are some of
the latest to develop and are structurally and functionally
immature in adolescence (e.g. Blakemore et al. 2007; Shaw
et al. 2008). Leighton et al. (2010) have suggested that
imitation and social attitudes are part of a positive feedback
loop in which pro-social attitudes generate imitation, and
imitation and/or being imitated further increases positive
social attitudes. Leighton et al. propose that this relation-
ship may be either innate or a product of social learning:
humans may have an innate tendency to mimic more when
they are in an affiliative frame of mind, or they may learn
through interaction with others that it is under these
circumstances that imitation tends to be most rewarding.
Accordingly, it may be the case that the adolescent brain
develops in accordance with genetically pre-programmed
changes and that the neural machinery for associating
positive social attitudes with imitation is not fully devel-
oped until adulthood. Alternatively, it may be the case that
as adolescents gain more experience with the imitation/
positive social attitude positive feedback loop described
by Leighton et al. the association between imitation and
positive social attitudes is strengthened. Studies showing
that learning is often accompanied by neural changes (see
Galvan 2010 for recent review) highlight the possibility
that the strengthening of an association between imitation
and positive social attitudes may play a part in the devel-
opment of the adolescent brain. Further studies are neces-
sary to gauge relative contributions of genetically pre-
programmed developmental changes and those triggered
by changes in the social environment.
The original, naturalistic, experiments demonstrating a
link between pro-social attitudes and imitation (e.g. Lakin
and Chartrand 2003) could not dissociate whether the
effect of pro-social priming was specific to imitation or
whether it could be explained by effector priming. Leigh-
ton et al. suggest that the effect is specific to imitation since
pro-socially primed adults were faster to conduct a hand-
open response when observing a hand-open response rather
than being faster to open their hand when observing any
hand movement. However, the paradigm used by Leighton
et al. did not include a test of effector priming and therefore
cannot show whether pro-social priming acts specifically
on imitation. To directly test whether social attitudes
modulate effector priming, we included an Effector Prim-
ing Control task. Supporting the hypothesis that social
priming would have a specific effect on imitation, our
Adult Group demonstrated a modulation of imitation by
social priming, whereas effector priming was unaffected.
The specific effects of social attitude priming on imitation
are in line with the theory that imitation inhibition is a
separate ability, unrelated to performance on more classical
inhibition tasks (Brass et al. 2003) and which results in
activation of distinct neural areas (Brass et al. 2005).
Conclusion
The current study shows that whereas pro-socially primed
adults show greater imitation than non-socially primed
adults, this effect was not found for an Adolescent Group.
The lack of the social priming effect for the Adolescent
Group may be a result of the immature development of
social brain regions and/or of reduced experience of imi-
tating and being imitated and the positive social attitudes
that this can generate. Analysis of our Effector Priming
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Control task demonstrates that the effect of social priming
that can be seen in the Adult data is specific to the mech-
anisms of imitation.
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